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Abstract
In many African countries, user fees have failed to achieve intended access and quality of care im-
provements. Subsequent user fee reduction or elimination policies have often been poorly planned,
without alternative sources of income for facilities. We describe early implementation of an innova-
tive national health financing intervention in Kenya; the health sector services fund (HSSF). In HSSF,
central funds are credited directly into a facility’s bank account quarterly, and facility funds are man-
aged by health facility management committees (HFMCs) including community representatives.
HSSF is therefore a finance mechanism with potential to increase access to funds for peripheral facili-
ties, support user fee reduction and improve equity in access. We conducted a process evaluation of
HSSF implementation based on a theory of change underpinning the intervention. Methods included
interviews at national, district and facility levels, facility record reviews, a structured exit survey and a
document review. We found impressive achievements: HSSF funds were reaching facilities; funds
were being overseen and used in a way that strengthened transparency and community involve-
ment; and health workers’ motivation and patient satisfaction improved. Challenges or unintended
outcomes included: complex and centralized accounting requirements undermining efficiency; inter-
actions between HSSF and user fees leading to difficulties in accessing crucial user fee funds; and
some relationship problems between key players. Although user fees charged had not increased, na-
tional reduction policies were still not being adhered to. Finance mechanisms can have a strong posi-
tive impact on peripheral facilities, and HFMCs can play a valuable role in managing facilities.
Although fiduciary oversight is essential, mechanisms should allow for local decision-making and en-
sure that unmanageable paperwork is avoided. There are also limits to what can be achieved with
relatively small funds in contexts of enormous need. Process evaluations tracking (un)intended con-
sequences of interventions can contribute to regional financing and decentralization debates.
Key words: Accountability, Africa, community involvement, decentralization, peripheral facility financing, quality of care, relation-
ships, user fee removal
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Introduction
Peripheral public health facilities play a potentially valuable role in
the implementation of primary health care in developing countries,
but face significant challenges in levels of resources, quality of care
and accessibility to potential users (Ranson et al. 2003). Such chal-
lenges, and pressure from funders, led many African countries to
introduce user fees in the 1980s. Waivers and exemptions were
incorporated into user fee policies to protect specific categories of
patients from costs, such as young children, pregnant women and
the poor (McPake et al. 2011; Ridde and Morestin 2011). User fees
are now widely recognized as being inefficient in raising substantial
revenues for health facilities (James et al. 2006). They have also
been found to reduce demand for health services, especially among
the poor. Intended improvements in access and quality of care have
therefore generally not been realized (Lagarde and Palmer 2008;
McPake et al. 2011; Ridde and Morestin 2011).
In response to user fee problems, many countries introduced user
fee reduction or elimination policies in the 2000s, and new exemp-
tions for particular patient groups or health conditions (Meessen
et al. 2011). These policies have faced significant implementation
challenges as they have often been introduced fast, without adequate
planning and communication and without alternative sources of
income for facilities. The result has been sudden increases in uti-
lization of ill-prepared facilities, leading to concerns about quality
of care. To prevent or overcome such challenges, facilities have often
retained or re-introduced higher user fees (Meuwissen 2002; Lewis
2007; Chuma et al. 2009). Intended gains of user fee reduction or
elimination have thereby been undermined.
Challenges with user fees and their reduction have contributed
to interest in alternative peripheral facility finance mechanisms,
including performance-based financing (PBF). Studies have shown
that although PBF is a potentially powerful tool for increasing key
targeted outputs, there can be perverse outcomes such as targets
skewing activities and performance away from more complex ser-
vices, increased administrative and monitoring burdens and costs,
and gaming (Eldridge and Palmer 2009; Witter et al. 2012;
Chimhutu et al. 2014). This literature suggests: (1) there is need for
continued identification and tracking of a wider range of peripheral
facility financing mechanism options; and (2) tracking of any facility
finance intervention should not only consider if it works (black box
approach), but also how it works or does not work, including with
regards to interactions with the broader health system, how it is per-
ceived by different stakeholders and the potential for unintended
consequences [open box approach (Ssengooba et al. 2012; Borghi
et al. 2013; Witter et al. 2013)]. The latter approach is relatively
rare, but critical to contribute to knowledge about how to improve
design and implementation of finance interventions (Witter et al.
2013).
Kenyan peripheral health facilities have faced many of the chal-
lenges related to user fee policy noted above and followed a similar
policy journey. In Kenya, health centres and dispensaries control
relatively few resources: the central Ministry of Health supplies fa-
cility infrastructure, qualified health staff, drugs and equipment; and
provides money for operational expenses such as support staff,
maintenance, allowances, fuel and non-medical supplies (MOPHS
1996). User fees were first introduced in the 1980s, together with
district health management teams (DHMTs) and health facility
management committees (HFMCs) (Oyaya and Rifkin 2003).
HFMCs, including community representative members, became a
requirement for all public health centres and dispensaries, with a
role of overseeing general operations and management of facilities,
including user fees.
In 2004, recognition that user fee charges were too high and vari-
able led to the introduction of the ‘10/20’ policy. This policy aimed
to reduce and standardize fees to 10 and 20 Kenyan Shillings (KSH)
(0.15 US dollars and 0.29 US dollars) in dispensaries and health
centres, respectively. Exemptions were mandated for all children
under five, antenatal care and deliveries, and treatment for malaria,
tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases. An implementation
challenge was that central level funds for operational expenses were
often failing to reach peripheral facilities. Funds cannot be spent at
district level without an authority to incur expenditure (AIE), a fis-
cal receipt issued by Treasury through the Ministry of Health dele-
gating financial authority and approving the expenditure of public
funds according to an existing budget (Government of Kenya
2009b; Opwora et al. 2010). However, almost a third of allocations
approved under AIEs were not received at district level in the mid-
2000s (Ministry of Health 2007). In addition, facilities struggled to
access funds distributed through districts due to bureaucratic and li-
quidity problems at the District Treasury which channels public
funds for district activities, and most health sector funds were spent
at DHMT level (Ministry of Health 2007). One approach to cope
with the limited operational expenses was to continue to charge
higher user fees. Thus facilities did not strictly adhere to the user fee
reduction policy, and quality and access concerns remained
(Opwora et al. 2010; Molyneux et al. 2012).
Recognition of these challenges contributed to the introduction
of an innovative national health financing intervention called the
health sector services fund (HSSF). HSSF goals for peripheral public
health facilities are to increase resources for services, to account for
these resources in an efficient and transparent manner, and to
strengthen community involvement in facility management
(Government of Kenya 2009a; Ramana et al. 2013).
Following a pilot in one province (Opwora et al. 2010), phased
nationwide implementation began with public health centres in
October 2010, and public dispensaries in July 2012. Under HSSF,
the Government and development partners [mainly Danish interna-
tional development agency (DANIDA) and the World Bank] con-
tribute to a central fund, which is used to credit funds directly into
an approved facility’s bank account every quarter. HSSF funds are
Key Messages
• Alternative financing mechanisms to user fees are needed in peripheral facilities.
• Health sector services fund (HSSF) is an innovative direct facility funding mechanism in Kenya.
• Early national experience with HSSF suggests impressive achievements.
• Challenges include complex relationships and accountability requirements. Process evaluations are essential to track fi-
nance interventions.
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intended to cover the facility’s operational expenses according to fi-
nancial guidelines set out by the ministry for public health and
sanitation (MOPHS) (MOPHS 2010), including items such as facil-
ity maintenance, refurbishment, support staff, allowances, commu-
nications, utilities, non-drug supplies, fuel and community-based
activities. At facility level, HSSF funds are managed by HFMCs
which have been given a stronger financial oversight role. HFMCs
should include five residents of the facility catchment area with at
least secondary school education, including three women, and four
ex-officio members, including the health facility in-charge, and rep-
resentatives of the provincial administration and the district medical
officer of health (DMoH) (Government of Kenya 2009a). Other
funds available to the facility, such as user fee revenue, and grants
and donations received locally, should be banked in the same ac-
count, and be managed and accounted for together with HSSF
funds. The Ministry continues to provide facility infrastructure,
trained health workers, drug kits and medical supplies directly to
facilities. It is recognized that HSSF alone will not be able to im-
prove service delivery. However, HSSF has the potential to contrib-
ute to improved quality of care, adherence to user fee policies and
ultimately improved equity in access to health care.
In this article, we present findings from an open box process
evaluation of early experiences of HSSF in Kenya. The findings are
relevant to ongoing discussions on the future of HSSF in Kenya, and
have implications for international discussions on user fee reduction
and removal, and alternative health financing options.
Study methods
We conducted a process evaluation based on a theory of change
underpinning the intervention (Figure 1); a theory derived from
the literature and discussions with stakeholders prior to national
implementation (Opwora et al. 2010). The evaluation was con-
ducted 1 year after national implementation in health centres,
and 6 months after implementation in dispensaries. A case-
control evaluation approach was not possible given nation-wide
implementation in one stage, and it was considered too soon
after implementation to include a quantitative pre–post compari-
son. Data collected included qualitative interviews at national,
district and facility levels, facility record reviews, a structured
exit survey and a document review. The approach and tools
were based on the theory of change, but were kept deliberately
open to allow for the identification of unintended and unex-
pected effects, including on the broader health system. Facility-
based empirical work focused on health centres, given their lon-
ger experience with HSSF by the time of data collection, while
national level interviews and document reviews covered HSSF in
both health centres and dispensaries.
National level key informant interviews
At the national level, we interviewed nine key informants represent-
ing the Ministry of Health, the HSSF Secretariat and international
stakeholders from the World Bank, DANIDA and the Danish
Embassy. Four key informants were interviewed in both 2012 and
2013, four only in 2012 and one only in 2013. Interviews concerned
their roles in support, supervision and oversight of facility level
funding, and their perceptions of HSSF and its implementation.
Data on HSSF disbursements and expenditure patterns up to
January 2013 were also obtained.
District and facility level in-depth interviews
District and facility-based data collection took place in April and
May 2012. Five districts were purposively selected to ensure a range
of socio-economic levels and geographic locations (two rural, two
urban and one mixed). In each district, one weak and one strong
performing health centre were selected on the basis of discussions
with DHMT members. Facilities perceived as substantial outliers in
performance terms were excluded.
We interviewed DHMT and DMoH in each district, and five
county-based accountants (CBAs). In the 10 selected health centres,
we held individual interviews with the facility in-charge (total
n¼10), and a focus group discussion with at least three HFMC
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Figure 1. Theory of change underpinning HSSF. Source: (Opwora et al. 2010)
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members (10 discussions; 31 HFMC members). Interviews
covered: HSSF training, materials and systems; user fees charged;
changes in committees and community involvement in facilities; use
of HSSF funds; financial management of HSSF funds; and the per-
ceived impact of HSSF and factors influencing impact.
Structured exit survey
In each of the 10 selected health centres, we interviewed 10 patients
or their caretakers leaving the facility after receiving curative outpa-
tient care (n¼99). Over half of these ‘exit interviewees’ were aged
25–44 years (60.6%), and about half were bringing a sick child for
treatment (55.6%). Most (82.8%) were female, had completed pri-
mary school (84.9%) and reported literacy in Kiswahili (93.9%)
and English (76.7%). The survey covered interviewees’ awareness of
HFMC membership; any observed changes in the quality of care
provided at the health facilities, and sources of information on
HSSF.
Facility record reviews
In all 5 districts and 10 health centres, we reviewed records on
income and expenditure from January to December 2011. In the 10
facilities, we also observed whether information on income, expend-
iture, user fees, committee members, HSSF and patient rights was
publicly displayed.
Policy and programme documents
To supplement our own empirical work, we identified and reviewed
policy and programme documents relevant to HSSF, including re-
ports from an independent agency contracted to monitor on a quar-
terly basis HSSF’s fiduciary compliance, performance, governance
arrangements and value for money (World Bank 2012). The fidu-
ciary reports draw upon audits conducted in 20% of health facilities
under HSSF, 50% of districts and all provincial and national level
implementing entities. The authors received ethical approval from
their institutions.
Results
Following a brief overview of HSSF systems and procedures, we de-
scribe the process and experience of implementing HSSF in health
centres and dispensaries in Kenya.
Overview of HSSF systems and processes
HSSF resources should be credited directly to each designated facil-
ity’s bank account every quarter: 1339 USD for health centres,
327 USD for dispensaries and 1565 USD for DHMTs.
At the facility level, all funds including HSSF and user fees
should be managed by the HFMC, which has responsibility for pre-
paring and implementing the facility’s annual operational plan
(AOP) and quarterly implementation plans (QIPs), and associated
budgets. The planning process should be supported by a facility
stakeholders’ forum organized by the facility in-charge, consisting of
the HFMC, and local stakeholders including health development
partners (Ramana et al. 2013). To account for funds received and
used, facilities submit Monthly Expenditure Returns, Monthly
Financial Reports and Quarterly Financial Reports using standard
formats to the DHMT. These are just some of the financial manage-
ment documents and reports that facilities have to fill for HSSF, as
outlined in the Operational Guide (Table 1) (Government of Kenya
2009a).
The DHMT review and monitor facility records and reports, and
account for their own funds in similar ways to facilities. The DHMT
submits a consolidated monthly financial report to MOPHS at the
national level, through a HSSF secretariat responsible for overall
management and oversight of the fund. The District Treasury was
not given a specific role in HSSF, although it does have general fidu-
ciary oversight of all government activities in the district, including
health facilities. When reports are approved, money for the next
quarter is transferred directly into the facility and DHMT bank ac-
counts from national level, and AIEs are issued for each facility at
national level.
DHMT HSSF funds are primarily to cover supportive supervi-
sion of facilities. In addition, CBAs were employed to offer add-
itional ‘hand-holding’ in HSSF financial management to peripheral
facility and DHMT staff, and to provide a link between facilities,
districts and the HSSF secretariat. In mid-2013, there were 100
CBAs employed (an average of 2 per county). Should further finan-
cial management support be needed by facilities, they can use HSSF
funds to contract accounts clerks.
Table 1. Documents required for the management of HSSF at facil-
ity level and their availability at the 10 health centres visited
Documents required at facility level, as specified in the
‘operational guide to the management of HSSF’
Total
N¼ 10
Managing the HSSF—an operations guide 7
Guidelines on financial management for the HSSF 2
AOP 10
QIP 10
Chart of accounts 7
Memorandum vote book 8
Receipt book 4
Facility service register 3
Cash book 9
Cheque book 10
Cheque book register 6
Fixed assets register 9
Imprest register 7
Consumables stock register 8
Store register (stock cards) 10
Counter receipt book register 7
Receipt vouchers (F017) 5
Payment vouchers (F021) 10
Safari imprest form (F022) 5
Local purchase orders (LPO) 6
Local service orders (LSO) 4
LPO register 4
Request for quotations (RQF) 6
Stock cards (drugs) for all items in stores 10
Imprest warrants 6
Imprest register 6
Bank reconciliation forms (F030) 7
Counter requisition and issue vouchers (S11) 8
Counter receipt vouchers (S13) 10
Handover forms 3
Monthly service delivery report forms (MOH105) 9
Monthly financial report forms (MFR) 5
Monthly expenditure report forms (MER) 5
Quarterly financial report forms (QFR) 4
Outstanding imprest file 6
Bank statements file 10
Sources: in-charge interviews and facility record reviews.
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Prior to HSSF roll out in 2010; the HSSF secretariat facilitated
a 5 day training course for provincial managers, who in turn
organized 4–5 day training workshops in their respective districts
for facility in-charges and 2–3 HFMC members per facility. In add-
ition to HSSF modalities, the training covered the use of Electronic
Tax Register machines which were introduced in facilities in early
2011 to keep track of patient user fee payments. To support train-
ing, two HSSF manuals were produced, and later updated.
Accessing, planning, managing and reporting on HSSF
funds
22 841 758 USD had been allocated to HSSF by January 2013, with
the largest contributors being DANIDA (44%), the World Bank
(42%) and the Government of Kenya (14%). The total amount dis-
bursed was 21 406 580 USD, with the highest proportion disbursed
to health centres (52%), followed by dispensaries (22%) and
DHMTs (21%); 4% went to the HSSF secretariat. By January 2013,
funds were being sent to 262 DHMTs, 751 health centres and 2296
dispensaries. For financial year 2012/13, HSSF funds represented
only 0.9% of the total ‘on-budget’ funding for the Kenyan health
sector (Republic of Kenya 2012; World Bank 2012).
AOPs, QIPs and AIEs
All DHMTs and facilities audited in the quarter ending September
2012 were operating bank accounts for HSSF funds (World Bank
2012), but only about half (56% DHMTs and 46% facilities) had
received HSSF funds by the start of the quarter. Over the same
period, most DHMTs and facilities (92 and 89%, respectively)
had received the AIEs on time. These figures had been improving
over time.
In our interviews in districts and health centres, there were gen-
erally positive responses regarding having received HSSF funds and
structured AIEs. Furthermore, having AIEs that also covered user
fees reportedly assisted with transparency, and in reducing conflicts
between in-charges and HFMCs about allocation of user fee rev-
enues. However, concerns raised included delays in accessing funds
and receiving AIEs, AIEs not reflecting QIPs (particularly in rural
areas), and how to spend money allocated in AIEs to items not use-
ful for facilities. Delays were attributed to facility AIEs having to be
signed off quarterly in Nairobi, and facilities having to wait for
others in the district before QIPs or monthly reports were forwarded
to the national level by DHMTs.
There is a straightjacket on HSSF because they had given us sort
of an AIE . . . it has to be utilized on the item which is
indicated . . . even if there is a shortage you can’t supply or you
can’t provide the service out of that context (HFMC member).
Delays in funds and AIEs remained a major concern given the
potential to undermine a key HSSF goal—to reduce the complexity
and delays in accessing funds for facilities. Given that user fees were
banked and accessed with HSSF funds, these delays were also im-
pacting on access to user fees. Delays therefore reportedly brought
‘everything to a standstill’.
Financial reporting and documentation
Fiduciary reports show that most audited facilities (79%) had not
prepared the Monthly Financial Reports or Quarterly Financial
Reports for the quarter ending September 2012. On the basis of
selected key performance indicators related to reporting and docu-
mentation, 22% of facilities were rated satisfactory, 62% average
and 16% poor, although these figures had been improving every
quarter; an improvement also noted for DHMTs.
Many interviewees reported that completion of required reports
took significant amounts of in-charges’ time, with one national level
interviewee estimating that in 2013 in-charges were spending 20%
of their time on accounts. Balancing the time requirements for
accounting, documentation and patient care was described as ex-
tremely difficult:
Heh! . . . That [paperwork] is one of the most challenging things
in HSSF; one thing I cannot say I’m 100% sure how they are sup-
posed to be done. But I believe somehow I’m trying . . . and I
have signed a performance contract with the government, so
I’m [still] supposed to see maybe per day 30 clients you see. Now
balancing the two it’s a challenge (In-charge).
District and facility managers relied heavily on CBAs to assist
with financial accounting and documentation. CBAs assisted facili-
ties in prioritizing among the many required financial management
documents, and improvising to cope with the frequent unavailability
of official versions of documents (Table 1). Facilities for example
make their own ledgers and forms using photocopies or standard
black exercise books.
The role of districts and CBAs in overseeing
HSSF funds
DHMT members reported some lack of clarity between the DHMT
and CBAs regarding responsibility for conducting and funding the
day to day training and support for in-charges on financial manage-
ment. Furthermore, it became apparent that CBAs were reporting
directly to the HSSF secretariat accountant, and ‘bypassing’ the
DHMT, rather than working through it, as had initially been in-
tended. The importance of embedding CBAs within DHMTs was
regularly commented upon in interviews. Concerns may have been
linked to some lack of support from DHMTs: HSSF led to their los-
ing control over facility funds which had previously been channeled
through them; they were being directly allocated relatively small
amounts:
The requests from [DHMT] departments are just overwhelming
and the amount is so small. You don’t know who/how to allocate
that money to; it is so little (DHMT member).
A specific concern for some was the lack of involvement of the
District Treasury in HSSF systems and procedures. As noted in a
2013 Aide Memoire:
Posting of accountants to districts is yet to help improve compli-
ance with the government of Kenya fiduciary procedures under
HSSF. They are not linked with the District Treasury for tech-
nical support and integration within DHMTs remains weak and
accountants are not always included during supervision visits to
facilities (DANIDA–World Bank, 2013).
Many interviewees felt that these ways of working were contri-
buting to the verticalization and centralization of HSSF. However,
whether or not this was a major concern was a source of debate. For
example, one national level interviewee described the lack of in-
volvement of the District Treasury as having been ‘the Achilles heel’
of HSSF, while another argued that the establishment of a parallel
system had been necessary precisely because of the failings of the
District Treasury; and that integration with Treasury would essen-
tially lead to a collapse of HSSF. Those against integration also
noted that this verticalization and parallel system was a general
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problem for the Ministries of Health, and not an issue specific to
HSSF.
HFMCs and facility oversight
The Fiduciary Report for the quarter ending September 2012 found
that all health facilities visited had a properly constituted HFMC,
and that most (92%) had met at least once during the quarter to dis-
cuss the operations and activities of the respective facilities.
These nationally representative findings were reflected in the 10
health centres we visited. All had active committees, most of which
were re-constituted within the last 3 years, in accordance with the
guidelines. In addition to meeting at least every quarter, most facilities
also reported monthly meetings for executive committee members.
HFMCs, and particularly secretaries and chairmen, were generally re-
ported to be committed to their duties, which they primarily described
as linking the community to the health centre. Challenges reported
included the need for more training on modalities of HSSF and their
roles in its implementation, and some tension in relationships with in-
charges. Four in-charges reported being uncomfortable with the con-
stant questioning or ‘interrogation’ from HFMCs:
Some of them are not well oriented in their roles and responsibil-
ities, most of them were, but for those who were not you’ll find
that they have overstepped their mandate . . . this is in terms of
financial management they act like auditors but not overseers of
the implementation, . . . that has been a big problem because now
it brings a bad line between the facility in-charge and the com-
mittee (DHMT member).
HFMC members were reportedly only receiving allowances of
KSH 500/¼ (6 USD) per quarter, as standardized across the country,
for attending quarterly meetings (maximum four per year). These
payments were considered inadequate (‘peanuts’), even for an essen-
tially voluntary role, given the amount of time involved, and were
described as demotivating particularly for urban HFMCs.
Of interest is that only 38.8 and 18.0% of rural and urban exit
interviewees, respectively, had heard of HFMCs. Only 37.4% of all
exit interviewees had heard of HSSF; of these, most had heard about
it from the radio (25.6%) or health facility (23.3%). Only 16.2% of
those who had heard of HSSF described it correctly.
Facility income and expenditure
None of the 10 facilities where information on facility income was
collected reported adhering to the user fee policy at the time of free
care for under fives and KSH 20 for over fives (Table 2), although
some did exempt children with malaria (most urban facilities), chil-
dren with pneumonia (most rural) and adults with Tuberculosis (TB)
(most rural). The total income from user fees for facilities as derived
from facility records for 1 year (January to December 2011) ranged
from 910 to 25 455 USD, while the equivalent figures for HSSF funds
were 3870 to 6543 USD (Table 3). User fees and HSSF funds each
represented approximately half of total facility income, with the pro-
portion from HSSF in each facility ranging from 17 to 85%.
Expenditure figures from national records of all facilities receiv-
ing HSSF (Figure 2) show that almost a quarter of facility funds
were spent on wages, primarily for accounts clerks, watchmen/se-
curity staff, groundsmen and cleaners. High proportions of funds
were also allocated to medical supplies (14%), travelling accommo-
dation and subsistence (13%), other operational costs (11%), fuel
and lubricants (6%) and maintenance (6%). Only 2% of funds were
reportedly spent on purchasing drugs. In qualitative interviews,
urban health centres reported water, sanitation (toilets and cleaners)
and minor renovations as their most important uses of HSSF funds,
while rural facilities named casual labourers, essential drugs, food
and referrals. HFMC members also mentioned the importance of
HSSF in paying their allowances for meetings. Interviews revealed
some lack of clarity on whether HSSF funds could be used to buy
drugs or hire accounting clerks.
Table 3. Income from user fees and HSSF funds in 2011 at 10 health centres visited (USD)
Rural health centres Urban health centres Total
Income source Mean Median Range Mean Median Range Mean Median Range
User fees 7065 3348 910–14 854 6476 2007 972–25 455 6770 2502 910–25 455
HSSF 4864 5208 3869–5208 5505 5214 5202–6542 5185 5208 3869–6542
Other* 0 0 0 1862 0 0–9312 931 0 0–9312
*Income from other sources includes output-based aid for specific services in maternal and child health, and financial donations, both of which were only re-
corded in one facility.
Source: facility record review.
Table 2. User fees reported at 10 health centres visited (USD using 2011 average conversion rate 1USD¼ 84KSH)
User fees charged for Expected charges Rural health centres Urban health centres Total
Mean Median Range Mean Median Range Mean Median Range
2-year-old with malaria 0 0.24 0.24 0–0.6 0.21 0 0–0.83 0.23 0.12 0–0.83
Adult with malaria 0 1.45 1.67 0.47–2.38 0.81 0.83 0.24–1.67 1.13 0.95 0.24–2.38
2-year-old with pneumonia 0 0.12 0 0–0.36 0.19 0.24 0–0.48 0.15 0.12 0–0.48
Adult with pneumonia 0.24 0.98 1.07 0.48–1.43 0.45 0.24 0.24–1.07 0.71 0.60 0.24–1.43
Adult with TB 0 0.14 0 0–0.71 0.31 0.24 0–0.83 0.23 0 0–0.83
Adult with gonorrhoea 0 2.02 1.19 1.07–3.45 1.29 0.83 0.24–3.45 1.65 1.19 0.24–3.45
Woman at first ANC visit 0 2.64 2.98 1.43–3.81 0.98 1.19 0.24–2.02 1.81 1.43 0.24–3.81
Mother delivering 0 5.71 5.95 3.57–7.14 1.24 0.24 0–3.57 3.48 3.57 0–7.14
Source: in-charge interviews.
142 Health Policy and Planning, 2016, Vol. 31, No. 2
Some expenses that were rejected by the DHMT, CBA or HSSF
secretariat included newspapers, transport other than designated
ambulances for referrals, major renovations, locum health workers
and furniture. These became known as ‘ineligible expenses’ during
initial tranches, and members of the HSSF secretariat stated that
they would be increasingly heavily sanctioned where noted.
Responsibility for ineligible expenditure ultimately rests with gov-
ernment employees; that is the in-charge and the DMOH as opposed
to HFMC members. Potential consequences are known to include
demotion, suspension, transfer, sacking and salary deductions, with
these consequences described as contributing to some major anxiety
and inaction among some staff. Several in-charges were reportedly
‘kwamad [blocked] by terror’ at the thought of having to lose their
salary through accounting errors, preferring not to use or report on
funds at all than risk such sanctions.
Beyond ineligible expenditure, there were some cases of misuse
of funds such as user fee money being pocketed rather than re-
corded, a HFMC member taking a cash advance and then claiming
to have been robbed, and an in-charge trying to forge signatures of
HFMC members and transfer money to a personal account.
However, none of these cases were from the 10 health centres we
visited, and in national interviews, we were informed that only 10
or so people throughout the country (primarily DMOHs) had suf-
fered salary deductions for expenses that could not be explained.
Impact of HSSF funds on facilities’ quality of care
and utilization
Interviews and fiduciary reports suggested that HSSF funds were
generally being well used, with facilities able to improve their up-
keep, buy consumables to improve quality of care, and ensure visible
improvements in facilities and service delivery (World Bank 2012;
Ramana et al. 2013).
Of course [quality of care] has improved; initially if you didn’t
have gloves you would tell a client “we are sorry, we can’t help
you” (In-charge).
Paying bills we are able to, before we used to get a backlog of
bills but now we are able to pay our bills in time . . . we are able
to even to collect drugs if for example we are out of stock; we
can fuel a vehicle to go to the rural facilities and transport what-
ever excess drugs they have to our facility and make use of them.
So it has made many things possible (In-charge).
Improvements have reportedly been particularly visible and im-
pressive in dispensaries, where HSSF was described in national inter-
views as a ‘huge success’.
More than three-quarters (78.6%) of exit interviewees reported
an improvement in overall service delivery at the facility over
the previous year (and only 2.2% a deterioration). Approximately
two-thirds reported improvements in facility cleanliness (60.6%),
waiting time (59.6%), treatment given (59.6%), and about half im-
provements in the availability of medicine (50.6%), and the number
and courtesy of staff (44.9 and 43.8%, respectively). In-charges said
there were more patients coming to the facility because of the avail-
ability of drugs and lab reagents for testing, the improved general
condition of the facility, increased outreach programmes and afford-
able prices relative to private clinics. In one case, HFMC members
attributed the increased utilization to reduced user fees, which they
introduced as a result of HSSF funds. However, this reduction in
user fees was only reported in one facility; with most facilities main-
taining user fees well above official levels as noted above.
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Figure 2. Use of HSSF funds by all facilities receiving HSSF between July 2011 and December 2012. Source: HSSF secretariat, May 2013
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Within this overall positive picture, challenges alluded to
throughout the above results clearly had negative implications for
quality of care and motivation of facility and management staff.
These included the amount of paperwork, complaints about inad-
equate levels of funds at facility and district level, and debates about
roles and functioning of committees, districts and CBAs. Cross-
cutting all of these concerns was a sense by some in-charges of being
over-monitored; one mentioned that there was a quarter where the
facility had undergone so many external audits that health workers
had felt ‘harassed’.
Discussion
There are important limits to our study design: we cannot generalize
from our 10 purposively selected health facilities; we cannot quanti-
tatively compare data from those facilities with an appropriate base-
line or control group; and we did not measure technical quality of
care. However, a number of important conclusions can be drawn.
Overall, experience with HSSF suggests that peripheral finance
mechanisms can have important positive impacts on facilities in
terms of ensuring that funds reach facilities, and that such funds can
be overseen and used in a way that strengthens transparency and
community involvement. HFMCs, one of the most widely intro-
duced community accountability mechanisms across sub-Saharan
Africa (Molyneux et al. 2012), can play an important role in that
success, although with some limitations with regards to clarity of
role and downwards accountability to communities. Our interviews
suggest that having even relatively small amounts of funds being
spent on casual staff, basic improvements of facilities and simple
day to day facility needs can have an important impact on the condi-
tion of facilities, health workers’ motivation, patient satisfaction
and ultimately on quality of care and utilization. Experience with
HSSF also illustrates the possible positive impacts of a new finance
mechanism on the wider health system. For example, the application
of HSSF financial accountability systems to user fees reportedly
strengthened community involvement in decision making for all fa-
cility funds, and reduced disputes between community representa-
tives and frontline providers. These positive impacts were achieved
through a finance mechanism in which funds are allocated across
facilities based only on facility type, without any additional funding
based on performance on key indicators. This observation, also
made for an in-depth post-hoc evaluation of the pilot of this initia-
tive on the Coast (Opwora et al. 2010), is important given the grow-
ing interest in—but heated debate on—the appropriateness of
performance-based funding as a means to align the incentives of
health workers with public health goals in many developing country
contexts.
Within this overall positive experience, our evaluation of HSSF
implementation suggests a range of further issues for consideration
in selecting and evaluating periphery facility financing mechanisms
in the region.
Balancing fiduciary oversight with administrative and
monitoring burdens
One important challenge is the need to balance fiduciary oversight
with administrative and monitoring burdens (Witter 2009). Given
the potential for misappropriation and misuse in peripheral facilities
(McPake et al. 2011), there is clearly a need for fiduciary oversight.
However, HSSF experience illustrates the potential for these over-
sight mechanisms to undermine the initial intentions of a financing
intervention. HSSF was introduced to ensure that peripheral
facilities gain access to funds allocated to them by cutting the bur-
eaucracy involved, and enabling them to use their funds efficiently
and in a transparent manner. In practice AIE processing is
centralized, takes time and—importantly—ties down not only HSSF
funds but also what were previously relatively flexibly used user
fees. Thus, there is a risk not only that gains from finance interven-
tions are undermined, but also that there are broader unintended
consequences. A change in HSSF after our study was completed was
to shift from quarterly to annual AIEs. This may have reduced fund-
ing delays for facilities, but our data suggests that simplifying un-
necessarily complex accounting procedures would also strengthen
implementation.
Administrative and monitoring burdens were minimized in HSSF
by CBAs, who played a key support role for in-charges, including
through working with them to develop a range of coping strategies
and some local decision-making space and flexibility within guide-
lines. It has been raised elsewhere that implementation ‘on the
cheap’ should not be attempted (Ssengooba et al. 2012); in this case,
there would be particular risks with removing or under-supporting
such key support personnel, who essentially play an interface role.
The literature suggests that staff who interface between actors
within a complex system with different interests, relationships,
modes of rationality and power (Helsinki 2001; Long 2001), have
the potential to translate and re-shape interventions on the ground,
and to contribute to feeding frontline priorities and concerns up-
wards through the system to change the design and implementation.
We suggest this potential is recognized and harnessed.
Clarifying roles and responsibilities and
decision-making space at different levels
Clarity in the roles of stakeholders and implementers, and the nature
of relationships between key actors, are recognized as critical to pol-
icy implementation (Bossert 1998; Conyers 2007). Beyond some
concerns regarding relationships between HFMCs and in-charges
(see also Waweru et al. 2013), and between DHMTs and CBAs, a
specific area of discussion and debate in HSSF was the level of in-
volvement of the District Treasury in HSSF, with views ranging
from the lack of district involvement being ‘the Achilles heel’ of
HSSF, to an argument that HSSF was purposively designed to be a
parallel system—and at least initially—precisely to avoid the failings
of the District Treasury.
This verticalization/integration dilemma—whether or not to by-
pass or be integrated within systems that are perceived to be sub-
optimally functioning—is likely to be faced in many peripheral facil-
ity finance interventions in the region. Although not easily resolved
we suggest that it could be helpful to unpack finance interventions
into a list of potential key decisions across several health system do-
mains. For each decision, ideal ‘space’ at national, county/district
and facility level can then be agreed and (re)negotiated over time.
We suggest key decisions across key domains for HSSF in Figure 3.
Once decision-making space for key decisions is agreed, account-
ability systems downwards to communities and users, and upwards
to managers and funders can be considered, including making sure
that the total accounting responsibilities for each key actor are rea-
sonable, and do not undermine their ability to achieve their roles
(Waweru et al. 2013). Agreements clearly cannot be implemented
until appropriate organizational structures and capacities are in
place at each level. These issues and decisions are highly pertinent in
Kenya today: the election of a new government in March 2013 initi-
ated the implementation of a new constitution including devolution
of government functions from national level to 47 semi-autonomous
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counties. The Kenyan devolution has important implications for
government operations across all sectors, including health, in ways
that continue to be debated at the time of writing.
Interactions with user fees
We have noted above that peripheral finance mechanisms can have
broader positive implications in facilities. Nevertheless, there are
limitations to what a relatively small amount of fees can achieve.
For HSSF, donors and the government had hoped funds would in-
crease facility adherence to the 10/20 user fee policy, with positive
implications for access especially for the poor (Opwora et al. 2010;
Goodman et al. 2011; Molyneux et al. 2012). However, user fees
did not reduce in health centres to the 20 shillings policy, nor were
all exempted patients able to access care for free. In interviews it
was repeatedly emphasized that HSSF funds, while greatly appreci-
ated, were totally inadequate in meeting the diverse needs of the
facility. User fees therefore remained a key source of income: these
funds made up a substantial proportion of total facility funds,
in some cases a higher proportion than HSSF funds. This finding
supports those who have argued that user fee removal or reduction
is far from a simple ‘stroke of the pen’ exercise (Gilson and
McIntyre 2005), that additional resources to compensate for the loss
of user fees are needed, and that funding allocations should be based
on realistic assessments of facility needs.
Determining the appropriate level of compensation for user fee
losses in facilities in Kenya is challenging, as compensating facilities
according to current revenues will favour facilities with richer catch-
ment areas and thereby exacerbate inequities. However, the 2013
presidential announcement that all user fees would be removed from
peripheral facilities makes this task essential. Although it has been
reported that HSSF funds have been increased for facilities to com-
pensate for user fee losses, anecdotal evidence suggests that there is
lack of clarity regarding this at facility level, and that many facilities
are continuing to charge user fees, often with agreement from
HFMCs and managers. The ways in which user fee removal has
been implemented, and with what implications for quality of care,
needs further exploration.
The value of process evaluations
To develop a robust evidence base in this area, there is need to iden-
tify and track a wide range of peripheral facility financing mechan-
isms, including innovations such as HSSF. Our experience supports
the importance of using in-depth open box process evaluations
which consider if and how interventions work, interactions with the
broader health system, stakeholders’ perceptions, and the potential
for unexpected and unintended consequences. Witter et al. have re-
cently published a valuable framework to support PBF studies,
which can also be applied to other financing mechanisms (2013).
Such frameworks, and in-depth process evaluations presented here,
can assist in planning of appropriate future interventions.
Conclusion
HSSF experience suggests that finance mechanisms can have a
strong and broad positive impact on peripheral facilities. There have
been impressive achievements in ensuring that funds reach facilities,
and that all facility funds—including user fees—are being overseen
and used in a way that strengthens transparency and community in-
volvement. Also observed is that HFMCs, one of the most widely
introduced community accountability mechanisms in sub-Saharan
Africa, can play a valuable role in managing facilities. Challenges or
unexpected outcomes suggest: complex and centralized accounting
requirements can undermine efficiency goals of finance interven-
tions; finance mechanism implementation problems can have wider
negative impacts (in this case difficulties for facilities in accessing
crucial user fee funds); and the need for clarity in the roles and
Figure 3. Allocating decision-space for HSSF across key domains for decision making
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responsibilities of key actors. There are also clearly limits in down-
wards accountability to users and communities, and to the possible
achievements of one financing intervention in the context of wider
challenges, including an unreliable drug supply, poor access to
emergency transportation and shortages of qualified staff. Process
evaluations tracking (un)intended consequences of HSSF and other
similar interventions are needed to contribute to regional financing
and decentralization debates.
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